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To Form a More Perfect Union: Taxation, Economic
Efficiency, and the Dormant Commerce Clause in Department
of Revenue v. Davis*
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the means by which
both the federal and state governments raise and spend money.1
States and municipalities have long used debt issuance 2 as a method
to raise funds to provide services.3 Public debt issues of this type most
commonly take the form of municipal bonds,4 where an investor loans
money to the government in exchange for a bond note later
redeemable for the principal amount of the loan plus interest.5 The
amount of money raised by states and municipalities by debt issuance
is immense-for example, in the six-year period from 1996 to 2002,
"[s]tate and local government units issued nearly $2.1 trillion of tax-
exempt bonds."' 6 Roughly 33% of the money generated from these
bond sales went to education, 13% to transportation, and 11% to
utilities.7 These municipal bonds account for a substantial majority of
the capital expenditures by states and municipalities, financing
approximately two-thirds of local government outlays.' Given the
* © 2009 Casey J. Jennings.
1. See, e.g., Ed Henry, Obama Planning Ambitious Road Ahead, CNN, Feb. 13, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009POLITICS/02/13/obama.whats.next/index.html (covering the
debate over President Obama's federal stimulus package); ELIZABETH McNICHOL &
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RECESSION CONTINUES
TO BAITER STATE BUDGETS; STATE RESPONSES COULD SLOW RECOVERY 2 (2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/9-8-08sfp.pdf (covering the budget shortfalls of numerous states).
2. Debt issuance refers to the process by which an entity, often the government, will
sell securities to third parties in order to create immediate financing for the entity,
enabling the entity to provide services and construct buildings that it formerly lacked the
capital to do. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
FINANCE LAW 9-12 (1992).
3. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (2008) (highlighting that public
debt issues have been used to finance state and municipal services "[f]or the better part of
two centuries").
4. " 'Municipal bond' is commonly defined as a 'debt obligation of a state or local
government entity.'" Id. at 1805 n.2 (quoting JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 439 (7th ed. 2006)).
5. CYNTHIA BELMONTE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAx-EXEMPT BONDS,
1996-2002 at 151, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02govbnd.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
6. Id. (emphasis added). These "[s]tate and local bonds" are exempt from federal
income taxation. I.R.C. § 103 (2006).
7. BELMONTE, supra note 5, at 169-70.
8. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806 (citing LLOYD B. THOMAS, MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 55 (2006)).
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enormous sums involved, this system of public finance is vital to the
economic health of individual states and the United States as a whole.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed how the
interest paid by state and local governments to bondholders should be
taxed. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis,9 the Court
considered the Kentucky state income tax statute that exempts
interest earned on in-state municipal bonds from taxation while at the
same time taxing interest earned on out-of-state municipal bonds. °
The taxpayers argued that this differential tax scheme ran afoul of the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution" because it impermissibly
discriminated against interstate commerce. 2 After Kentucky state
courts split on the question of constitutionality, the United States
Supreme Court granted. certiorari due to the exceedingly far-reaching
consequences of this type of tax regime. 3 These consequences stem
from the fact that Kentucky is not alone in exempting from taxation
interest paid on in-state municipal bonds while simultaneously taxing
interest paid on out-of-state municipal bonds. 4 At present, forty-one
states have similar tax schemes for municipal bonds.' In fact, of the
states that have a state income tax scheme, only one, Indiana,
exempts all municipal bonds equally. 6
In Davis, the Court relied on the opinion in United Haulers Ass'n
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,7 issued in
the immediately preceding term, which recognized that government
functions are not subject to a standard dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. 8 Instead of subjecting the Kentucky law to the strict scrutiny
9. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
10. Id. at 1807. For the Kentucky state income tax statute, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 141.010(10)(c) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807.
13. Id. at 1807-08. The dollar figures of these municipal bonds are staggering. For
instance, "[b]etween 1996 and 2002, Kentucky [alone] ... issued $7.7 billion in long-term
bonds to pay for spending on transportation, public safety, education, utilities, and
environmental protection." Id. at 1806 (citing BELMONTE, supra note 5, at 169-70).
14. Id. at 1806-07.
15. Id. at 1807 n.7. These states include: Alabama, .Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. Several other states tax out-of-state bonds and exempt
some, but not all, in-state bonds. Id.
16. Id.
17. 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
18. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (citing United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343). The dormant
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analysis which would otherwise have been mandated, 9 the Court was
exceedingly deferential to the statute.' ° The Court noted that, when
analyzing a government function statute, the long-established
principle outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.2 l generally requires
that a balancing test be used to weigh the " 'putative local benefits' "
of the challenged statute against the " 'burden imposed on interstate
commerce.' "22 However, the Court declined to apply the Pike
balancing test in Davis, explaining that the Court lacked the
necessary expertise to engage in such an exercise. 3 After declining to
apply the Pike balancing test, Justice Souter concluded that
differential tax schemes like Kentucky's do "not 'discriminate against
interstate commerce' for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause"
and are constitutional.2 14 However, had the Court engaged in a Pike
analysis and weighed the benefits against the burden on interstate
commerce, it would have been apparent that differential taxation
distorts the interstate bond market and impairs national economic
efficiency. By failing to apply the Pike test, the Court unnecessarily
obfuscated dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and permitted
state regulation that frustrates a basic purpose of the Constitution.
In Part I, this Recent Development will detail the development
of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence culminating with the
expansion of the government function exception in United Haulers.
Part I will further explain (1) that dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence mandates that the Court inquire as to whether the
differential tax treatment of bonds impairs national economic unity
and efficiency under the Pike standard and (2) that the Davis Court
failed to conduct the mandated analysis. In Part II, this Recent
Development will conduct the Pike analysis that the Court failed to
perform, weighing the local benefits of the Kentucky tax scheme
against the burden it imposes on interstate commerce. Using the Pike
test, the local benefits of differential taxation may be overstated, and
Commerce Clause refers to "the principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if
they place an undue burden on interstate commerce." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 403 (2d ed. 2002). The dormant
Commerce Clause is an implied power of the federal government that is rooted in the
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the ability to regulate interstate commerce. See
id.
19. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343.
20. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811.
21. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
22 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
23. Id. at 1817.
24. Id. at 1811 (quoting United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342).
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in fact, differential taxation distorts the interstate municipal bond
market, thus diminishing national economic efficiency. This Recent
Development will conclude that the Davis decision is unclear,
incomplete, and violates established precedent.
I. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Purpose of the Commerce Clause: National Economic
Efficiency
Understanding the history and purpose of the Commerce Clause
is vital to comprehending its modern application. As well, a better
understanding of the Commerce Clause will allow for a better
understanding of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Clause's roots
lie in Congress's response to the failings of the Articles of
Confederation. The Articles failed to give Congress any authority
over interstate commerce, giving states carte blanche to regulate as
they saw fit." The weakness of the Articles in this regard resulted in
"a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states" that
"came 'to threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union.' "26 The
Founders realized that this interstate economic warfare could cripple
the young nation and began to take steps to rectify the problem.27 In
1786, representatives from the General Assembly of Virginia
proposed a convention with the other states, the sole purpose of
which was to evaluate interstate commerce and devise a uniform
system of regulation to advance the states' common interests.28 The
25. Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States
Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891, 893 (1990). Article IX did grant Congress "the sole
and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians ... provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not
infringed or violated." Id.
26. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,533 (1949) (quoting JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 240 (1st ed. 1833)). In
urging the states to ratify the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton argued:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true
spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others, and it is to be feared that ... if not restrained ... would be
multiplied and extended till they became . . . impediments to the intercourse
between the different parts of the Confederacy.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 26, at 140.
28. Hood, 336 U.S. at 533 (citing Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia
(Jan. 21, 1786), in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF
THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. DOc. NO. 69-398, at 38 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927))
(emphasis added). The so-called "Virginia Resolution" provided "that the National
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Founders recognized that the most vitally needed federal power was
the power to regulate a uniform system of national commerce. 29 They
formally adopted this power in the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution in 1787.30 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
prescribes that "[t]he Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. '31 The power of this statement is inversely
proportional to its length: the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is one of Congress's most powerful regulatory tools. 32 In
reality, the Commerce Clause serves two separate functions: the first
is the authorization of congressional action concerning interstate
commerce; the second limits state and local action concerning
interstate commerce.33 When operating in its second function, the
section is known as the dormant Commerce Clause.34
The dormant commerce power is not expressly included in the
Constitution 35 but is rather a judicial invention derived from the
Legislature ought ... to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the union, and also
in those cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation." DOUGLAS
KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND
PHILOSOPHY 234 (Combined Supp. 2008).
29. Hood, 336 U.S. at 533.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Daniel Webster stated in his brief to the Supreme Court in
Gibbons v. Ogden that the basic purpose of the Commerce Clause was "to rescue ... the
general Union from 'the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the
legislation of so many different States.' " KMIEC ET AL., supra note 28, at 233.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 238. When Congress uses the power granted by
Article I, Section 8, it is exercising the authority of the Commerce Clause actively. The
intrinsic power of the active Commerce Clause has been amplified rather than weakened
by the Supreme Court: indeed, from 1937 (the beginning of the New Deal era) until 1995,
the Court upheld every single law passed by Congress challenged under the active
Commerce Clause. Id. at 239.
33. Id. at 401.
34. Id. The dormant Commerce Clause, which generally prohibits state interference in
interstate commerce, is not clearly stated in the Constitutional text. Rather, the Supreme
Court has inferred the Commerce Clause's negative power. Id. This inference, as explained
by Felix Frankfurter, is essentially that the clause, "by its own force and without national
legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place limits on state authority." Id.
(quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
& WAITE 18 (1937)). In simpler terms, "some state legislation runs afoul of the Commerce
Clause, or limiting principles implied from it, even though Congress has not affirmatively
exercised its commerce power to preempt that legislation. The law falls simply because the
Commerce Clause is there, albeit in its dormant-that is, unexercised--state." DAN T.
COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209 (2004).
35. Because of the lack of textual basis, some jurists, Justices Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia chief among them, have disavowed the doctrine as an "exercise of judicial
power... for which there is no textual basis." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town
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silence of Congress regarding state-imposed barriers to interstate
commerce.36 Throughout its history, the Supreme Court "has
advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning
it has given to these great silences of the Constitution. '37 National
prosperity has consistently been used as the basic rationale behind
invalidating state action that restrains interstate commerce. For
example, in striking down a New York law restricting the sale of milk
from Vermont, Justice Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous Court in
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.," wrote that the Constitution "was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must
sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity [is] ... in
union and not division."39 From Justice Cardozo's comment it is
evident that a major reason the Court has restrained the power of the
states to impose barriers on interstate commerce is to promote the
economic efficiency of the Union.4°
B. The Modern Framework: United Haulers and Davis
The Court recently reaffirmed the established dormant
Commerce Clause framework in both Davis4  and United Haulers.42
Under that framework, judicial scrutiny of a state law alleged to have
violated the Clause begins with a threshold issue: whether the state
law, on its face, discriminates against interstate commerce. 43
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Many commentators have also
criticized the doctrine as a judicial usurpation of that which should be left solely to the
legislature. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of its
Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1991); Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the
Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism
Mantra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409,412 (1992).
36. The genesis of the dormant Commerce Clause can be seen in several nineteenth-
century Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118
U.S. 557, 558 (1886); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 275 (1876); Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1851); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 177
(1824).
37. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,535 (1949) (emphasis added).
38. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
39. Id. at 523 (1935) (emphasis added).
40. Justice Stewart noted this, stating that, historically, "the Court has viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere." Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (emphasis added).
41. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
42. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007).
43. See Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1808 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality
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Ordinarily, when a law "expressly draws a distinction between in-
staters and out-of-staters," it is discriminatory.' If the law is facially
discriminatory, it is "virtually per se invalid."'45 The only way that a
discriminatory law can pass constitutional muster is "if it 'advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.' "6 This, in practical
effect, requires a court to use at least intermediate scrutiny to
determine whether the state law is valid.47 The rationale for this
heightened review is that discriminatory laws are presumed to be
"motivated by 'simple economic protectionism.'"' However, if the
state law at issue is not discriminatory and "regulates even-handedly"
such that "its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental," the
court takes a markedly different approach. 9 When a law does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, the court uses a balancing
test 0 that often, but not always, upholds the challenged state
activity.5
The law at issue in Davis draws a distinction between municipal
bond interest payments based solely on whether the payments
originate in Kentucky or another state 2.5 The law's effect is "[to give]
favored tax treatment to some securities but not others depending
solely upon the State of issuance, and it does so to disadvantage
bonds from other States. '5 3 Furthermore, the statute is related to
of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)); United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338; Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429,433 (2005); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992).
44. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 412,414.
45. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of
Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978).
46. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of
Or., 511 U.S. 93,101 (1994)); see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,138 (1986).
47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 424. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Supreme
Court held that laws discriminating against interstate commerce required the use of "the
strictest scrutiny." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)). However,
as Professor Chemerinsky notes, "[riequiring only a 'legitimate' purpose is characteristic
of highly deferential rational basis review and not the 'strictest scrutiny.' " Id. The Court
has certainly imposed a standard of review more stringent than the rational basis test, but
it does not undertake a traditional strict scrutiny analysis in most cases. The Court in
United Haulers chose to categorize its approach as "rigorous scrutiny." United Haulers
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).
48. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338.
49. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 418.
51. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808-09.
52. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008).
53. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy thus
2009]
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interstate commerce because the in-state bonds and out-of-state
bonds are in competition with one another for the same investment
funds-indeed, that competition is what necessitates the differential
tax treatment.54 Accordingly, the law is discriminatory and would
ordinarily be subject to the "rigorous scrutiny" applied to
discriminatory laws.
To that end, the Court has historically struck down as
unconstitutional differential tax schemes that benefit in-state interests
and harm out-of-state interests. For example, in Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Commission,55 the Court struck down a New
York statute that placed a $350 maximum tax on New York securities
sales but taxed out-of-state sales without limitation.5 6 Justice White
reasoned that differential taxation distorted the securities market by
"foreclos[ing] tax-neutral decisions" of consumers in the market.57
Consequently, "the flow of securities sales is diverted from the most
economically efficient channels and directed to New York," a result
which is "wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the
Commerce Clause. '58 The Court also adhered to these principles in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,59 striking down a Hawaii tax scheme
that exempted local brandy from a 20% excise tax on liquor intended
to stimulate the development of Hawaii's liquor industry.60 Speaking
for a unanimous Court twelve years later, Justice Souter struck down
a North Carolina tax provision that reduced the state tax liability of
citizens who owned stock in corporations doing business in the state.
61
The practical effect of the provision, that "a North Carolina investor
[would] probably favor investment in corporations doing business
within the State," was deemed impermissible.6 2 This rationale closely
traces Boston Stock Exchange-if investors choose to avoid interstate
commerce because of another state's tax treatment of out-of-staters,
the restraint on trade is unconstitutional.63
concluded that the Kentucky statute was "an explicit discrimination." Id. (emphasis
added).
54. Id. at 1826.
55. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
56. Id. at 328.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Id. at 336.
59. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
60. Id. at 273.
61. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325,346 (1996).
62. Id. at 343.
63. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
318 [Vol. 88
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Prior to 2008, differential taxation usually violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.' The Davis decision, however, excluded the
discriminatory Kentucky tax law from the "rigorous scrutiny"
normally demanded. 65 Ordinarily, discriminatory laws are subject to
heightened scrutiny because they are presumed to be motivated by
protectionism.66 However, the Court explained in Davis that this
protectionism is not presumed when the discriminatory law "favors,
not local private entrepreneurs, but [State] and local governments. 67
Relying on United Haulers, decided the previous Term, Justice Souter
wrote that "a government function is not susceptible to standard
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by
legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism
the Clause abhors. '68 Instead, when a government receives the
benefits from a discriminatory law, but all private companies are
treated identically, the new presumption is that the state's motive is
64. In an early example from 1939, the Supreme Court considered a Florida statute
that required out-of-state cement be inspected upon entering the state and mandated the
payment of an inspection fee of fifteen cents per hundredweight. Hale v. Bimco Trading,
Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 379 (1939). The statute therefore imposed a tax on imported cement to
which in-state cement was not subjected. Id. The Court struck down the statute, saying
that "no reasonable conjecture can here overcome the calculated discrimination against
foreign commerce." Id. at 380. Continuing the trend, the Supreme Court invalidated an
Ohio law that awarded a tax credit to gas stations for selling ethanol produced in Ohio but
did not award the credit for selling out-of-state ethanol. New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988). Six years later, even Justice Thomas, a noted dormant
Commerce Clause opponent, joined in the long line of justices invalidating differential
state taxation by striking down Missouri's 1.5% use tax on using or consuming any article
of personal property purchased out-of-state. Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511
U.S. 641, 648-49 (1994).
65. The Supreme Court's established dormant Commerce Clause analysis has two
defined exceptions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 429. The Court uses a different
and less scrutinizing constitutional analysis when (1) Congress authorizes the state action,
and (2) the state is acting as a "market participant." See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) (describing the "congressional authorization" exception); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10 (1976) (articulating the "market participant"
exception). In Davis, the Court relied somewhat on the market participant exception in
excluding the Kentucky tax from the heightened scrutiny reserved for discriminatory laws,
stating that "there is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax scheme makes
sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer [in addition to being a regulator]."
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1812 (2008). The Court used the fact that
Kentucky was acting (at least somewhat) as a market participant as a justification for
analyzing the statute under a balancing test. Id. This Recent Development does not
attempt to explain the merits of that conclusion.
66. United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338-
39 (2007).
67. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1814.
68. Id. at 1810 (citing United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343).
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not protectionism, and, thus, the law is constitutional. 69 Accordingly,
the Davis Court analyzed the discriminatory Kentucky statute as a
non-discriminatory law.70
The balancing test generally used in analyzing non-
discriminatory laws is governed by the standard articulated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,7 which states that the challenged state law " 'will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' "72 To
satisfy the Pike test, a court must conduct a "cost-benefit analysis"73
to measure two things: (1) the local benefits and (2) the burden on
interstate commerce.
In Davis, the Court began a Pike analysis but then failed to
complete it. The Court identified the nature of the local benefits, 4 but
then began questioning whether Pike would apply to the facts of the
case. 5 The Court ultimately determined that Pike could not be
applied because the Pike analysis was not raised below in Kentucky
state court.76 Even if Pike did apply, the Court stated that "the
Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw the reliable
conclusions of the kind that would be necessary" to find the statute
unconstitutional7 7 because courts are " 'unsuited to gather the facts
upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally
untrained to make them.' "78
However, after placing the Kentucky tax scheme under the
balancing test umbrella reserved for non-discriminatory statutes, the
Court only conducted one side of a balancing test-the side of the
69. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342.
70. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810. Justice Souter explained that the logic of United Haulers
"applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State's municipal bonds, given that the
issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function,"
hence, "[t]he Kentucky tax scheme falls outside the forbidden paradigm." Id. at 1814.
71. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
72. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (alteration in original) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
73. See id. at 1818 (categorizing Pike as a cost-benefit test).
74. Id. at 1810 ("By issuing bonds, state and local governments [s]pread the costs of
public projects over time.") (quoting AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 2, at 11)
(alteration in original).
75. Id. at 1817 (indicating that a "market participant" exception would eliminate the
need for a Pike analysis). The so-called "market participant" exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause generally provides that where a state itself enters into interstate
commercial activity, as either a buyer or seller, it may choose to purchase only from in-
state producers or sell only to its own citizens. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (6th ed. 2000).
76. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1818 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997)).
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scale measuring "putative local benefits" was not weighed against any
analysis of the burden on commerce. The cost-benefit test generally
prescribed by Pike was limited in Davis to just a "benefit" test
without consideration of any potential costs.79 But, a basic analysis of
the underlying economics of the challenged Kentucky statute would
have revealed an economic burden. Additionally, a basic economic
analysis would have revealed the fact that the "local benefits"
purported to result from the differential taxation of municipal bonds
can actually result in local harm. After evaluating the underlying
economics of differential municipal bond taxation, the economic
burdens might well exceed the local benefits. Thus, the statute would
fail the Pike analysis and be unconstitutional.
II. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF DIFFERENTIAL TAX SCHEMES
A. Neoclassical Framework
A simple and recognized framework is needed to effectively
evaluate (1) the burdens of the tax scheme on interstate commerce
and (2) the putative local benefits. One widespread and tested
framework useful in analyzing market economics is the neoclassical
theory. Neoclassicism 8° posits that resources are most efficiently
allocated by the operation of free markets and that this efficient
allocation leads to utility maximization.8 Utility maximization is the
satisfaction one gains by consuming.8 2 The basis of neoclassical
economics is thus that free markets most effectively lead to the
satiation of society's needs and wants.
This is not a treatise on the merits of neoclassicism as an
economic theory. However, a survey of the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence indicates the Court's willingness to
adopt a neoclassical understanding of economics. The Court has
reasoned that the national prosperity of the United States stems from
the national common market mandated by the dormant Commerce
79. Id. at 1817.
80. Neoclassical theory has often been defined as a "metatheory," "a scientific
research program that generates economic theories." E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical
Economics, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed.,
1993), available at http://www.econlib.org/library[EncllNeoclassicalEconomics.html. This
"program" is governed by three basic, unchanging assumptions: "1. People have rational
preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits.
3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information." Id.
81. See Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L.
REv. 417,430 (2008).
82. Id
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Clause, 83 and this requirement establishes that the United States
should be "an area of trade free from interference by the States."
4
The Court's basic premise in evaluating the dormant Commerce
Clause has always reflected this free trade purpose.85 If states were
permitted to restrict trade to benefit in-state businesses and burden
out-of-state businesses, the Court has stated that it " 'would invite a
multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free trade
which the Clause protects."86 The Court has even gone so far as to say
that "the fundamental purpose of the Clause is to assure that there be
free trade among the several States. This free trade ... is a freedom to
trade with any State, to engage in commerce across all state
boundaries" to assure that business operations are conducted in the
most efficient place possible.87 Capitalist free trade principles,
therefore, have historically driven the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.88 This sentiment was espoused by Justice
Jackson, who stated:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude
them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has
given it reality.89
Focusing on the efficiency of the free market, the Court's historic
view comports with the basic tenets of neoclassical economic theory,
83. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (quoting
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970)).
84. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,252 (1946).
85. See, e.g., McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327,330 (1944).
86. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
87. Id. at 335-36.
88. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause, as historically
interpreted, "becomes a charter of free trade," and hence "an element of an efficient
federalism"). In recent years, however, the Court has begun to retreat from interpreting
the dormant Commerce Clause to categorically endorse free markets. See Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) ("The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States
and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does
not elevate free trade above all other values.").
89. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,539 (1949) (emphasis added).
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with its emphasis on efficient markets90 and competition.91 However,
the Court retreated from this long-held position in Davis, upholding
an anticompetitive tax regime that fosters, at least to some degree,
inefficient interstate capital flow.
B. Davis and the "Burden on Interstate Commerce"
To perform the Pike balancing test that was not performed by
the Supreme Court, one must weigh the potential burden a state law
imposes on interstate commerce against any potential benefits
conferred by operation of the law.92 As will be demonstrated, a Pike
analysis of differential taxation of bonds yields, at best, inconclusive
results and demonstrates that the burdens of differential taxation may
actually outweigh the benefits. Because the Pike issue is at least a
close call (meaning, at a minimum, that the Pike test does not clearly
demonstrate that the tax regime is inconsequential to economic
efficiency), the Supreme Court was obligated to address it rather than
cursorily assert that the Court cannot conduct the analysis.
The first step in a Pike analysis is to assess any potential burden a
challenged law places on interstate commerce. The Kentucky statute
clearly has an effect on interstate commerce by imposing a tax regime
whereby "states seeking to attract both in-state and out-of-state
capital for public projects must sell their securities in two distinct
markets-a market enjoying only a federal tax exemption," the out-
of-state market, "and a market enjoying both federal and state tax
exemptions," the in-state market.93 The result of this market
segmentation is that the price of out-of-state bonds is artificially
raised by the application of the state income tax. This extra cost can
90. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997) ("The dormant
Commerce Clause protects markets and participants in markets.").
91. See Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and
Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 533 (2005). "[T]he Supreme Court's dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence might be said to embrace a pro-competition stance,
consistent with the ideology and goals of the neoclassical economics framework, in which
law sees its primary role as intervening to correct for market failure." Id. This is not to say
that the sole purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to promote economic efficiency
through the endorsement of free market principles. See id. The Clause has also been
interpreted to promote political efficiency as well. Id. at 536. "Rather than inherently
protecting competition and free markets, the purposes of [the Clause] can be understood
within the frameworks of Madisonian democracy as well as efficiency-specifically, as
limiting welfare-reducing interest-group rent-seeking in the state regulatory process." Id.
92. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008).
93. James F. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the
New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State
Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473,546 (1978).
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instill a disincentive for investors in one state to buy bonds in
another94 by lowering the yield on out-of-state bonds, thereby
restricting the interstate flow of capital used to finance local projects.
Determining the size of the disincentive requires an evaluation of the
amount by which the out-of-state bond holder's after-tax yield is
decreased compared to tax free in-state bonds. The application of
state income tax can, in the highest tax brackets, impose a significant
premium on out-of-state bonds. In the upper brackets, tax rates can
range from 4.75% in Maryland to 7.75% in North Carolina to as high
as 10.30% in California.95 This is not to say, however, that out-of-state
bonds are subject to the effect of a 10.30% tariff because municipal
bond income is also exempt from federal gross income.96
In order to determine the cost imposed on holders of out-of-state
bonds, it is necessary first to ascertain the "effective tax rate"
attached to those bonds.97 This rate is represented by the formula:
Effective tax rate = (Nominal state tax rate) x (1 - Marginal federal
income tax rate).98 By way of illustration, assume that a holder of an
out-of-state bond is taxed by the state in which he lives at a marginal
rate of 10% and that he is subject to a federal marginal rate of 35%.
His effective tax rate would be 6.5% ((0.10) x (1 - 0.35)). This is only
the first step in determining a bond holder's after-tax yield. After-tax
yield is derived by multiplying the current bond yield by (1 - effective
tax rate). 99 Continuing the example, a person owning a 7% out-of-
state bond would have an after-tax yield of about 6.5% ((0.07) x (1 -
0.065)). Therefore, with differential taxation, if a comparably priced
in-state bond were available with a 7% yield, the disincentive to an
investor to buy an out-of-state bond would be roughly 0.5% (0.07 -
0.065). While seemingly insignificant, the true dollar figures can add
up quickly. If a large investor were to choose to purchase $1,000,000
of municipal bonds and be faced with this choice, his profit would be
$70,000 on an in-state bond investment but would be $5,000 less on an
out-of-state investment. This effect is magnified the larger the bond
94. See C. Steven Cole et al., The Capitalization of the State Tax Exemption Benefit in
Municipal Bond Yields, 7 J. FIN. & STRATEGIC DECISIONS 67, 67 (1994).
95. LEHMAN BROS. ASSET MGMT., MUNICIPAL BONDS: CURBING THE IMPACT OF
STATE TAXES 2 (2008) [hereinafter LEHMAN BROS.], available at http://www.nb.com/MYP
/NBIPUB/28282/NFA/HIK/VN/doc/i0245_munibondscurbingimpact of state taxes.pdf.
96. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006) ("[Giross income does not include interest on any State
or local bond."); Steven J. Hueglin, State and Local Tax Treatment of Municipal Bonds, in
THE MUNICIPAL BOND HANDBOOK 47, 51 (Frank J. Fabozzi et al. eds., 1983).
97. Hueglin, supra note 96, at 51.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 59.
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holder's state tax rate; "[c]onsequently, the greater a state's income
tax rate, the greater the benefit from the exclusion, and the interest
rate the state must offer can be lower."1 This cost of borrowing, as
determined by the market for loanable funds, can be represented
graphically, as noted below in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Differential Taxation's Effect on Interest Rates'01
i D 2
Q 
8
02 Q1 Q
Figure 1 begins with the assumption that no state subjects
municipal bond interest payments to taxation, so there is no market
segmentation based on citizenship. The demand for out-of-state
bonds in this state-income-tax-free world is represented by D1, the
supply of bonds issued out-of-state is represented by S, the
equilibrium interest rate is il, and the equilibrium quantity of out-of-
state bonds purchased is Q1. If a state imposes a tax on out-of-state
bonds, as in Kentucky, the after-tax yield on those bonds decreases.
100. Posting of Joseph Henchman to Tax Foundation: Tax Policy Blog, http://www.tax
foundation.org/blog/show/23229.html (May 27,2008).
101. See LAWRENCE S. RITTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 56 (9th ed. 1997). Figure 1 represents a basic supply and demand
for loanable funds where quantity Q is denoted on the x-axis and the interest rate i is
denoted on the y-axis. Id. The demand-for-bonds curve is denoted by D1 and is upward-
sloping, indicating that as the interest rate for a municipal bond increases, consumers will
lend more money to states and municipalities by buying more bonds. Id. The supply-of-
bonds curve is denoted by S and is downward-sloping, indicating that as the interest rate
(the price of borrowing) increases, states and municipalities will seek to borrow less
through bond issues. Id. The equilibrium interest rate is at the intersection of the supply
and demand curves. Id. This rate is termed the equilibrium point because "[a]t any other
interest rate, there is an excess of either borrowers or lenders, and competitive pressure
will force the rate toward its equilibrium level." Id.
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Accordingly, the demand for out-of-state bonds decreases because
investors are less willing to buy out-of-state bonds at the same level.
The new demand curve for out-of-state bonds is represented by D2.
This shift places the new equilibrium point at E2, which increases the
equilibrium interest rate to i2 and decreases the quantity of out-of-
state bonds purchased to Q2. However, if the state continues to
exempt in-state bonds from taxation (as nearly all states do), the
equilibrium interest rate for in-state bonds would remain at the lower
il level. In order to compete for out-of-state lending, states must
increase the demand for out-of-state bonds by raising the after-tax
yield to approximate or match il.
To accomplish this shift in demand, states and municipalities are
forced to "offer a high enough return to compensate out-of-state
investors for the tax disadvantages."102 This increases the borrowing
costs associated with raising capital for education, infrastructure,
public health, and other local projects.1"3 These additional borrowing
costs can be calculated using "municipal equivalent yield multipliers"
which are furnished by many investment banks. 1°4 To determine how
much states must increase yield to be competitive in other states,
bond issuers should multiply their current yield by the relevant state
multiplier. 105 For instance, if New Jersey sought to finance an
education initiative and hoped to compete for the vast number of
New York investors in the highest bracket, who have the option of
purchasing a similar in-state bond paying 5 %, New Jersey would have
to offer a yield of 5.235%,1° raising borrowing costs by nearly a
quarter of a percent. Considering that in the period from 1996-2002,
New Jersey issued $27,719,000,000 in long-term government bonds, 10 7
this additional cost is not insignificant, even at low percentages. As a
102. Blumstein, supra note 93, at 546.
103. See Cynthia Belmonte & Emily Shammas, Tax-Exempt Bonds, 2006, STAT.
INCOME BULL., Fall 2008, at 247, 262, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/08fallbultebond.pdf (summarizing the uses and dollar amounts of municipal bond
financing).
104. See LEHMAN BROS., supra note 95, at 2 (providing the 2008 multipliers); see also
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, Calculating the Taxable Equivalent Yield for Municipal
Bonds, http://www.morganstanleyindividual.com/markets/bondcenter/school/tey/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2009) (providing the 2007 multipliers) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley].
105. See LEHMAN BROS., supra note 95, at 1.
106. The municipal equivalent yield multiplier for the 35% federal tax bracket in New
York is 1.047. Id. This figure therefore represents the formula (.05 x 1.047). The multiplier
is even larger for lower tax brackets (1.048 for the 33% bracket and 1.052 for the 28%
bracket), meaning that a state seeking lower income New York investors must offer an
even higher yield to entice higher income investors. Id.
107. BELMONTE, supra note 5, at 169.
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result, if the discriminatory tax schemes were to be eliminated across
the country, "many governmental issuers might well be able to
market their securities at a lower interest cost than they now do."10
This economic analysis illustrates that the interstate municipal
bond market is artificially distorted by differential taxation schemes
like Kentucky's because without such a tax scheme the market would
function differently and produce different outcomes for both
investors and bond issuers. This market distortion is not neutral, but
imposes a burden on interstate commerce. These tax laws decrease
the effective yield of out-of-state municipal bonds by subjecting them
to state income tax and exempting similar in-state bonds from
taxation. The result of this decreased yield is that the demand for
bonds decreases in states that seek out-of-state capital for local
projects. Because the demand for bonds decreases, the interest rate
that these states must pay to compete with in-state bonds is increased,
thus making borrowing across state lines more expensive. These
burdens can be significant because of the vast dollar amounts
involved in municipal bond debt. However, the fact that a law
imposes burdens on interstate commerce is not of itself dispositive
under Pike. To determine whether these differential schemes
impermissibly burden interstate commerce, they must be weighed
against any local benefits they provide. °9
C. Davis and "Putative Local Benefits"
In Davis, Justice Souter identified several purported local
benefits furthered by differential taxation." 0 The opinion pointed out
that many small municipalities rely on "single state" bond funds to
finance their relatively small-scale projects."' These single state funds
package the bonds issued by relatively obscure municipalities
normally ignored by interstate markets 1 2 because national funds tend
not to devote the time and energy necessary to investigate or
purchase bonds issued by smaller public entities."3 These single
market funds, and, by proxy, funding for small municipal projects,
108. Blumstein, supra note 93, at 547.
109. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
110. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
111. Id. at 1816.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Brief for National Federation of Municipal Analysts as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 15, Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-
666), 2007 WL 2115441).
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benefit greatly from the development of intrastate bond markets
fostered by state income tax exemptions and would be significantly
harmed if forced to compete in a national market."4 According to the
Court, if they were to strike down state income tax exemption, these
single state bond funds would likely disappear, limiting the funding
opportunities of many smaller municipalities."' Should these smaller
entities wish to remain competitive in an open, national market, they
would undoubtedly be forced to offer higher yields to appear on the
"radar" of larger bond funds, resulting in increased borrowing costs
to these small entities that might be in a poor position to absorb
them.' 6
Another subset of borrowers that benefits from the tax exempt
status of in-state bonds is high-tax states."7 As state income tax rates
increase, the tax benefits to bond purchasers increase as well.' 8 As a
result, high-tax states can effectively shield their bonds from
interstate competition. 119 Because the state income tax in these high-
tax states adds a relatively expensive premium on out-of-state bond
holdings, investors have a strong incentive to lend to in-state
borrowers rather than out-of-state borrowers. 20 Differential taxation
is thus a boon for high-tax states, such as California. 2' This benefit,
however, comes at the expense of lower-tax states whose residents do
not have such a strong disincentive to invest out-of-state.2 2 Residents
of those states have less of an. incentive to lend to in-state borrowers
than their counterparts in higher-tax states; thus, a flow of capital
114. See Brief for National Federation of Municipal Analysts as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 19, Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-
666), 2007 WL 2115441 [hereinafter Brief for National Federation of Municipal Analysts].
"As in other markets, the likely impact of a more national market for municipal bonds
would be to tilt the market further towards larger, nationally-recognized market
participants and to squeeze out or decrease the competitiveness of smaller and more
obscure participants." Id. at 19-20.
115. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816.
116. See Cole et al., supra note 94, at 73 (noting that personal tax exemptions lower the
borrowing costs of in-state municipalities).
117. See Brief for Tax Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25-26,
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2808464
[hereinafter Brief for Tax Foundation]; Blumstein, supra note 93, at 546 ("The effect of
the present arrangement could well be that states with large concentrations of capital [and
high tax rates] are better able to retain those funds for in-state investment.").
118. Cole et al.,supra note 94, at 73.
119. See Brief for Tax Foundation, supra note 117, at 25.
120. Id. at 26.
121. See Morgan Stanley, supra note 104.
122. See Henchman, supra note 100.
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from low-tax states to high-tax states is more likely than a flow of
capital from high-tax states to low-tax states.
1 23
Furthermore, while small municipalities and high-tax states enjoy
some significant benefits from differential taxation, not all local
effects are beneficial. Differential taxation schemes decrease in-state
borrowing costs, 24 but there is evidence to suggest that, rather than
aiding states, such tax schemes adversely impact many states' bottom
lines."2 Studies indicate that the amount of foregone tax revenue that
could have been collected by taxing the interest on in-state bonds
sometimes exceeds any potential borrowing cost savings that in-state
government entities gain.26 In other words, the revenue that could be
generated by taxing the income of in-state bondholders often exceeds
the revenue actually generated from selling tax-exempt in-state
bonds. The relationship between state welfare (the "bottom line")
and lost revenue resulting from exempting in-state bonds from
taxation can perhaps best be explained graphically, as demonstrated
by Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Foregone Tax Revenue Resulting from Differential
Taxation'27
i2 E2 
D2 01
Eli
i3
02 01 1
123. See id.
124. See Brief for National Federation of Municipal Analysts, supra note 114, at 8.
125. See Cole et al., supra note 94, at 73.
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., DENNIS APPLEYARD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 301 (5th ed.
2006) (explaining the geometric relationship between demand, price, revenue, and
deadweight loss in the context of international trade). For an explanation of the notations
used in the figure, see supra note 101.
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Figure 2 represents the supply and demand curves for imported
(i.e., out-of-state) municipal bonds. The demand for bonds by out-of-
state investors is illustrated by Dl and the supply for out-of-state
bonds is illustrated by S. Without differential taxation, the
equilibrium point of lending and borrowing is at El and the
equilibrium rate of interest is at il. If the state in which the lender
resides enacts a differential taxation scheme whereby the state
exempts in-state bonds but does not exempt out-of-state bonds, the
demand for bonds by out-of-state investors decreases, representing a
decreased willingness by investors to purchase out-of-state bonds.
The new equilibrium point is at E2, representing a decreased flow of
capital out-of-state, and the new equilibrium interest rate is increased
to point i2, representing the higher yield that out-of-state borrowers
must offer to compete. The state enacting the differential tax scheme
realizes revenue in the amount of the shaded area, i3i2E2F,28 while
investors in out-of-state bonds experience a "deadweight loss"
measured by the shaded area GE2E1.129 The state's welfare, however,
will be decreased if the "deadweight loss" exceeds the area ili3FG,
which is the cost of the differential tax borne by out-of-state
borrowers. 30 Empirical evidence suggests that indeed differential
state taxation schemes diminish in-state welfare.' This result is
approximated by Figure 3. This figure is the same graphical
representation as Figure 2. It has been altered to emphasize the
allocation of the costs of differential taxation as between in-staters
and out-of-staters.
128. See APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 127, at 301.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See Cole et al., supra note 94, at 73.
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Figure 3: Diminished Welfare Caused by Differential Taxation'32
i3 E2 S
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While there are certain situations in which differential taxation
provides putative local benefits, as in the case of small
municipalities,'133 research suggests that the net effect on state welfare
is actually negative.134 An economic analysis of differential taxation of
the type described by Pike thus indicates that differential taxation of
interstate municipal bonds imposes a burden on interstate commerce
and might actually harm local interests by reducing tax revenue. Pike,
however, requires that a differential taxation scheme produce a
positive net benefit.1 35 Accordingly, the Kentucky law might well be
unconstitutional under Pike.
CONCLUSION
According to long-established dormant Commerce Clause
precedent, if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is "virtually per se
illegal."1 36 Differential taxation schemes, which tax out-of-state
132. See APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 127, at 301. For an explanation of the
notations used in the figure, see supra note 101. The darkly shaded triangle, GE2EI, is
larger than the lightly shaded area, iHi2FG.
133. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1816 (2008); Brief for National
Federation of Municipal Analysts, supra note 114, at 11.
134. Cole et al., supra note 94, at 73.
135. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
136. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of
Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)); accord City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (declaring that economic protectionism elicits a per se rule of invalidity).
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business activity differently than in-state activity, have historically
been struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional,'37
especially when, as here, a law "forecloses tax-neutral" decision
making by investors. 138 The Davis Court, however, held that disparate
tax treatment of in-state and out-of-state bond interest "is not
susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to
its likely motivation by legitimate objectives [rather than] ...
economic protectionism."'39 The Court upheld the tax regime based
on the benefits derived by local governments, explaining that
"[f]inancing for long-term municipal improvements" would be
harmed if the scheme were to be struck down."4 The Court thus
analyzed the Kentucky statute as a non-discriminatory "government
function" law.'4 ' Generally, the long-established principle outlined in
Pike v. Bruce Church requires that a balancing test weigh the
"putative local benefits" of the challenged statute against the "burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce" when analyzing a "government
function" statute.1 42 However, the Court failed to analyze the law
under the Pike balancing test normally reserved for such laws.
The Davis decision holds that " '[c]ourts as institutions are
poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of
various methods of taxation.' "'" The real effect of Justice Souter's
opinion is to uphold the challenged law because of putative benefits
without analyzing the burdens of the statute on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court punted on Pike, first by saying Pike might not
apply,' 44 and second by holding that even if Pike did apply, the Court
was not in a position to apply it because it lacked economic
expertise.4 This indecisive holding leads to two possible conclusions.
First, the Court could be overturning the Pike balancing test. Second,
the Court might be unsure when and how to apply the Pike balancing
test. This confusion led to a tangled decision, where the Court
137. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 346 (1996); Associated Indus. v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1994); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-75
(1988); Bacchus Imp., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 379
(1939).
138. See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331.
139. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810 (citing United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,343 (2007)).
140. Id. at 1816.
141. Id. at 1810.
142. Id. at 1808 (alteration in original).
143. Id. at 1818 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996)).
144. Id. at 1817.
145. Id. at 1818.
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weighed one factor then retreated, rejecting the balancing of putative
local benefits against any other factor. Ultimately, the Davis decision
leaves uncertain where the dormant Commerce Clause and the Pike
balancing test stand.
Had the Court engaged in a Pike analysis, there is a serious
question as to whether the challenged tax scheme would have passed
constitutional muster. First, by analyzing the putative local benefits of
differential taxation, it is apparent that small municipalities and some
high-tax states benefit. However, evidence also suggests that the loss
realized by these states as a result of foregone tax revenue from in-
state bond interest outweighs the benefits.' 46 Second, by analyzing the
impact on interstate commerce, it appears that the tax scheme
discourages interstate capital flows and increases borrowing costs to
states aiming to borrow from out-of-state bond holders.147 Whether
the "burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits"148 is not certain, but the
question is close enough not to be rhetorical; that is to say, the
question demands an answer.
By waffling on the Pike question, the Court unnecessarily
complicates and confuses dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
and permits state regulation that frustrates the basic purpose of the
Constitution by distorting the interstate bond market, licensing state
protectionism, and fostering national economic inefficiency. This fails
the spirit of long established dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence promoting union and efficiency and contravenes the
principles handed down in previous differential taxation cases. 149
Given that this decision blurs the Commerce Clause analysis for laws
such as the Kentucky tax scheme, the Court should reconsider the
Davis decision to clearly follow or denounce the Pike analysis and
clarify dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
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